Arguments on The Cold War Economy

The problems created by the cold-blooded warfare economy are outlined clearly by the authors. The military economy of the U.S. is the major reason for the failure of the nation's assiduity to get hold of the lead in industrial and technological innovations globall(a)y:

The pre-emption of resources for military-industrial missions, particularly precious and scarce scientific and technical labor, has pallid served purely commercial industries such as machine tools, industrial equipment, steel, autos, and consumer electronics. In these industries, stiff competition from abroad . . . has eroded American market share and humiliated domestic producers. . . . (2).

Even during the forceful military exp remainderitures and defense build-up years of the Ronald Reagan era---right on the verge of the end of the Cold struggle---the employment growth in the defense industry was not enough to offset the collapsing employment rate of the non-defense sector.

some(prenominal) the benefits of the Cold war economy, then, the costs were---and are---great. It is economically suicidal to cypher keeping the economy on the kindred track it was on during the Cold War, and not even the most conservative pol would suggest such a thing. The question is not whether a conversion is needed, but only how it is to be ac

complished. It leave be difficult and painful and leave take tremendous effort and much time:

It has been a traditional argument of defense industry supporters that the Cold War economy has at least brought about innovations in defense-related applied science which were then successfully holded to the non-defense needs of the nation. The authors argue, however, that this has not been the literal case. As we read:

To support such an about-face, the nation's infrastructure and human race capital would need considerable refurbishing and retraining. But substantial rigidities and adjustment problems are making the transfer of resources from the military-industrial sector to other sectors preferably difficult. The nation seems to be stuck in the war economy trough (7).

The authors go on to argue that an economy which was able to adapt to the sudden needs of the military from the 1940s on could do the same thing in response to the non-defense needs of that same society. This nation "has demonstrated its ability to combine teamwork, technological expertise, and planning, all under the auspices of the open sector, to accomplish a mixed mission" (11).

Nevertheless, there are clear signs that such a conversion is possible. In the first place, as we read, the kind of cooperation surrounded by government and private industry and funding which marked the Cold War era could be repeated in the post-Cold War conversion of the economy. The authors write that their "version" of the new economy "encompasses public as well as private commitments to environmental, health, housing, and infrastructure programs. tonality features include a responsive science and technology constitution and incentives to firms, workers, and their communities. . . . " (11).

While there is no doubt that the United States is undetermined of adapting and converting its economy to the needs of the post-Cold War society, the question remains whether it will in fact do so. The urgency of adapting to a war economy in the 1940s
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